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The EU has strengthened its relations with Morocco, but not




The EU’s Neighbourhood Policy aims to develop stronger relations between the EU and its eastern and
southern neighbours. Iván Martín writes on the progress made in developing relations between the
EU and Morocco. He notes that while the EU has engaged in a number of initiatives and helped to
promote economic and institutional reforms in the country, this has not reached the level required to
bring about real change of the kind previously achieved in southern or eastern European states.
During his last visit to Morocco in May 2014, EU Commissioner for Enlargement and European
Neighbourhood Policy Stefan Füle stated that “the EU-Morocco relationship is a ‘success-story’ in
the southern neighbourhood” and that it is becoming part of the “terms of reference in the region”.
As a matter of fact, the number of initiatives taken in all fields of bilateral relations over the last 15 years since the
accession to the throne of King Mohamed VI in July 1999 is impressive. What is less clear is what all these
initiatives have brought about in terms of structural transformation of the Moroccan political regime and economic
prospects, convergence to EU living standards and actual integration into the EU economic and social area.
Indeed, even after five years of deep economic crisis in
Europe, assuming that the real convergence rhythm
experienced by Morocco between 1995 and 2013 would
be sustained (during that period, its per capita Gross
Domestic Product in purchasing power parity has gone
from 10.6 per cent of the euro area average in 1995 to
18.8 per cent in 2013), it would still take 69 more years,
or two generations, for Morocco to reach a level of 50
per cent of the euro area average living standards.
In the last two years, the whole set of bilateral
cooperation instruments have been renewed. Indeed,
bilateral relations were “particularly dynamic in 2013”,
as stated in the Progress Report on the Implementation
of the European Neighbourhood Policy for Morocco
published in March 2014. This hyperactivity contrasts,
however with the resilience of main bilateral issues and
the lack of progress in the strategic position of Morocco
in relation to Europe, as if bilateral relations would work
as a hamster’s wheel requiring perpetual movement to stay in the same place.
Advanced Status
The legal framework of bilateral relations, the Association Agreement, has not changed since 1996. And the
Advanced Status granted by the EU in October 2008 as a general political framework lacked real substantial
commitments in the key areas of bilateral relations. Subsequently, it has been diluted by extending it to Jordan in
October 2010 and then by the Privileged Partnership with Tunisia agreed in September 2011 (without any clear
difference or added value between them).
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Some of the prospects it opened, such as engaging in a discussion about ways to extend to Morocco the EU
structural funds methodology, have not materialised. This notwithstanding, aid volumes have increased substantially
during these years (from an average of €4.7 per inhabitant in 1995-2006 to 5.45 in 2007-2010 to 6.2 in 2011-2013
and more than €8 per inhabitant and year during the EU financial period 2014-2020). To keep figures in perspective,
if Morocco were an EU Member State, according to the regional policy regulations it would be entitled to a maximum
of €98 per inhabitant a year in structural funds (based on the ceiling of 4.25 per cent of GDP of each beneficiary
country set in 2005).
In December 2013, both parties agreed to a new Neighbourhood Action Plan 2013-2017  replacing the Action Plan
agreed for the 2005-2010 period. Significantly, the text of the Action Plan setting out priorities for bilateral
cooperation for the coming four years has not been published, in contrast with the practice of transparency
established in the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy.
Mobility Partnership
Along the same line, in June 2013 Morocco became the first Southern Mediterranean partner to sign a Mobility
Partnership with the EU setting a framework for policy dialogue on migration between the two parties (and the nine
Member States adhering to it). But so far it has had no practical implication: a visa facilitation agreement and a
readmission agreement are being negotiated under this framework, but the Mobility Partnership as such does not
contain any commitment to facilitate legal labour migration or improve the status of Moroccan residents in Europe.
The only concrete result has been the launching of a €5 million project to support the implementation of the Mobility
Partnership focused on technical assistance and capacity building.
Towards a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area
The last novelty in this set of initiatives has been the ratification in July 2014 of the new four-year protocol to the
Fisheries Agreement of 2007, basically an exchange of fishing rights for a number of European vessels in Morocco’s
territorial waters (including, incidentally, Western Saharan waters subject to an international law dispute) for €30
million payments a year by the EU. This agreement takes up on the former ones dating back to 1995, although its
application had been suspended since December 2011 due to lack of agreement and as a political sign from Rabat.
The next big issue on the agenda now is the completion of the negotiations of a Deep and Comprehensive Free
Trade Area (DCFTA) launched in March 2013. This DCFTA is poised to replace the Free Trade Agreement signed in
1998 and culminated with the total liberalisation of bilateral trade on industrial goods since March 2012. The DCFTA
should also include trade in services, government procurement, competition, intellectual property rights, investment
protection and, most importantly, bringing the Moroccan legislation in line with the EU legislation in all trade-related
areas, including industrial standards and technical regulations and sanitary and phytosanitary measures.
But the compensation and incentives the EU is ready to offer for this submission to the EU regulation model is
unclear, and the costs of such a process might be substantial for Morocco in some sectors. The recent signature of
the first DCFTA between the EU and Ukraine might provide some indication, although geopolitical considerations
probably bias any comparison; in any case, the opening up of the EU market to the products of the Eastern
Partnership countries will certainly have a negative impact on Moroccan exports, as was already the case with the
2004 EU enlargement to Eastern Europe.
The Agreement on Agricultural, Processed Agricultural and Fisheries Products  which entered into force in October
2012 implemented a far-reaching liberalisation of bilateral trade in this sector, but basically kept the quotas and
minimum entry prices for sensitive Moroccan agriculture products (such as tomatoes, clementines and oranges, and
cucumbers, among others). In April 2014, a unilateral modification of the calculation method of the entry price to the
EU market of fruits and vegetables caused a yet unresolved row between the EU and Moroccan authorities.
In the meantime, year after year the EU is making a consistent trade surplus with Morocco, which has remained
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above the €6 billion mark ever since 2008. In 2013, the EU exported more than €17 billion in goods against a
volume of imports of around €10 billion. To put these figures into perspective, it should be noted that EU exports
concentrate in machinery, chemical products and transport equipment, which have a much higher added value than
agricultural products and clothing mainly exported by Morocco to the EU.
Ultimately, over the last fifteen years EU cooperation has no doubt become an important contextual factor pushing
for economic and institutional reforms in Morocco. It has also a key role in promoting “Europeanisation” of the legal
framework in Morocco, and hence underpinning the “Western” choice of the country. But so far it has not reached
the threshold required to make the difference and bring about a structural transformation equal to the one it triggered
in accession countries (first in Southern Europe, in particular in Spain and Portugal, and then in Eastern Europe), as
originally intended by the European Neighbourhood Policy.
In this regard, the level of engagement of the EU still classifies Morocco largely as a “third country”, not as part and
parcel of the European economic area. Upon a closer look, most initiatives in bilateral relations seem targeted more
to showcase Morocco as a model for other countries in the region and the Moroccan regime as a legitimate and
reliable partner rather than to transform it into a fully developed and democratic country.
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